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The aim of this paper is to estimate marginal abatement costs (MAC) of N-fertiliser tax policies which aim 
to prevent NO3 levels from rising. Estimates of MAC provide information on how large reductions in N-
fertilisation rates should be before other measures are considered. Based on N-response experiments from 
Croatian ﬁeld trials with maize, N-response curves were estimated and proﬁt maximising N-doses were 
derived. Values of NO3-N concentration in lysimeter water from the same treatments were used to estimate 
an NO3-leaching function. A sample of 20 Croatian family farms was used to obtain records of producer and 
input prices as well as actual N-doses. Abatement costs and MAC for an N-tax, a product tax and an N-
quota were estimated. The MAC for all the instruments are non-constant and increase at an accelerating 
rate. The MAC for N-taxes are positive for N-taxes lower than 60%, indicating a net return to society. Re-
duction rates in fertilisation up to this level should be achieved before considering governmental support 
for other measures. The N-tax has the lowest abatement cost and the lowest MAC for a particular level of 
reduction while the N-quota has a lower MAC than the product tax when total reduction levels are below 
20 mg NO3 l-1.
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Introduction
Non-point-source pollution involving nitrogen (N) 
from agriculture is widely recognised to be a major 
cause of water-quality problems. Excessive levels 
of N-fertilisation may increase nitrate (NO3) leach-
ing. The negative effects of excessive N-leakage 
are well documented: N is a plant nutrient which 
causes eutrophication and, as a consequence, algal 
bloom  and  the  possible  death  of  ﬁsh  and  other 
aquatic life. Another principal side effect or exter-
nality is rising NO3 levels in drinking water. N, in 
the form of NO3, is easily soluble and transported 
in runoff, in tile drainage, and with leachate. In 
many locations in Europe and North America, ex-
cessive  N-application  may  be  a  cause  of  water 
problems (Grifﬁn and Bromley 1982, Andréasson 
1990,  Hanley  1990,  Sumelius  1994, Vatn  et  al. 
1996,  1997,  Bleken  and  Bakken  1997,  Jansson 
1997, van der Bijl et al. 1999, Granstedt 2000, 
Shortle et al. 2001).
In the USA, intensiﬁcation of farming systems 
through increased nutrient use is one reason for the 
pollution of surface water and ground water, and 
for the impairment of water quality (Yadav et al. 
1996,  Ribaudo  2001,  Shortle  1996).  In  western 
Europe, there is clear evidence that increased ferti-
liser use may contribute to the pollution of both 
surface and groundwaters (Gren et al. 1997, Brou-
wer and Hellegers 1997, Goodchild 1998, Hanley 
2001, De Clerc et al. 2001). Recently, high levels 
of NO3-leaching from agricultural activities have 
also been found in some areas of the Central and 
Eastern  European  Countries  (CEEC),  e.g.  in 
Croatia, Poland and Romania. Claims have been 
made  that  these  NO3-concentrations  could  be 
above a safe NO3 level (Tomic et al. 1997, Romic 
et al. 1997, Klacic et al. 1999, Zellei 2001, Toma 
2002, Zellei et al. 2002).
Increased concern that NO3-leaching was be-
coming a signiﬁcant problem led to the Nitrate Di-
rective addressed to EU Member States in 1991. 
The main objective of the Nitrate Directive is to 
reduce water pollution resulting from or induced 
by the NO3 that comes from agricultural sources, 
and to prevent further such pollution. The Nitrate 
Directive recognises groundwater containing more 
than 50 mg NO3 l-1 as being situated in vulnerable 
zones (Directive 91/676/EEC). This corresponds 
to 50 mg l-1 * 0.226 = 11.3 mg l-1 NO3-N (pure N). 
The conversion factor 0.226 is based on the atomic 
weights of N and oxygen (O). In some European 
countries, stipulation of a maximum amount cor-
responding to 170 kg N ha-1 that can be spread in 
the form of manure has been adopted (De Clerck et 
al. 2001).
One of the general aims of this article is to es-
timate how N-fertiliser tax policies can prevent 
NO3  levels  from  rising  in  Croatian  agricultural 
systems, and to consider the implications from the 
viewpoint of farm management. The ﬁrst speciﬁc 
objective of this study is to determine whether 
Croatian farmers exceed proﬁt-maximising levels 
of N-fertiliser use in maize (Zea mays) cultiva-
tion. If this is the case, farmers could choose to 
either  reduce  fertiliser  intensity  in  order  to  in-
crease proﬁtability, or search for other critical fac-
tors or management practices in the farming sys-
tem that are limiting their yield levels. Such an 
adjustment of agricultural practices in maize pro-
duction would result in the better utilisation of N 
and, as a consequence, reduced levels of NO3 in 
groundwater. On the other hand, if farmers opti-
mise their use of N-fertiliser, there will be a real, 
farm-level cost associated with this reduced inten-
sity. A second speciﬁc objective of this research is 
to estimate the abatement costs of a given amount 
of NO3 and the marginal abatement costs (MAC) 
of reducing NO3-leaching through the use of eco-
nomic instruments: a tax on N-doses, the use of a 
product tax or the imposition of a fertiliser quota. 
The MAC are the marginal change in social costs 
resulting from a reduction of one mg NO3 l-1 in the 
leaching water. The MAC of N-fertiliser tax poli-
cies  employed  to  reduce  NO3-leaching  provide 
vital information on how large reductions in N-
fertilisation  rates  should  be  before  considering 
other measures such as catch crops, buffer strips 
or catchment dams.
Using the theory of externalities, it has been 
shown that a tax on the externality (i.e. the efﬂu-
ent) represents the optimal ﬁrst-best solution when 
markets are competitive and when information is 295
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complete (Baumol and Oates 1988). When the ef-
ﬂuent  is  not  observable  (which  is  normally  the 
case in connection with non-point-source pollu-
tion) the regulator must use some indirect instru-
ments  such  as  taxes  on  inputs  or  the  ﬁxing  of 
standards for farming practices (Braden and Seg-
erson 1993). Second-best instruments are the min-
imisation of costs subject to environmental con-
straints and subject to the additional restriction of 
being sub-optimally differentiated across produc-
ers. Plausible instruments will necessarily be of a 
second-best nature (Horan and Shortle 2001). Fur-
thermore, according to Weinberg (1991) efﬂuent 
taxes may represent an optimal second-best solu-
tion in cases where an efﬂuent production function 
can be estimated with certainty. In practice, due to 
the nature of non-point source pollution, fertiliser 
taxes have often been used as a substitute for efﬂu-
ent taxes. A review of experiences with fertiliser 
taxes in Europe has been published by Rougoor et 
al.  (2001).  According  to  their  review,  fertiliser 
taxes in Austria, Finland and Sweden varied be-
tween  10%  and  72%  of  the  price  of  fertilisers. 
Price elasticity in these situations was estimated to 
range between –0.1 and –0.5.
Some  estimates  of  MAC  for  fertiliser  taxes 
have been reported. Vatn et al. (1997) found that a 
100% N-tax leads to a cost for farmers of about 
NOK 4  per  reduced  kg  of  N-leaching  (which 
equals NOK 17.7 per reduced kg of NO3-leaching 
or approximately EUR 2 per reduced kg of NO3-
leaching). The corresponding social MAC per kg 
related to reduced leaching of N (equivalent to the 
cost to society of a reduction of 1 kg in N-leach-
ing) were estimated as approximately NOK 20 per 
additional kg of N-leakage. These ﬁgures are aver-
ages from three different study areas in southeast-
ern Norway and varied somewhat depending on 
the area.
Lankoski  and  Ollikainen  (1999)  simulated  a 
30% reduction in N-leaching in their study of al-
ternative  agri-environmental  policy  reforms  in 
Finland. They found that a fertiliser tax is less ef-
ﬁcient in reducing N-leaching than a buffer-strip 
subsidy.  Depending  on  the  initial  situation,  the 
abatement  cost  of  one  reduced  kg  of  N  was 
FIM 24.7 (EUR 4.15) for a fertilizer tax and an 
acreage subsidy, FIM 40.7 (EUR 6.85) for a re-
duced price support and a buffer zone subsidy and 
FIM 30.7 (EUR 5.16) for a fertiliser tax combined 
with a buffer zone subsidy. Lankoski (2000) also 
concluded that an agri-environmental policy mix 
which compensates for the increase in fertiliser tax 
through a higher buffer-strip subsidy had a strong-
er reductive effect on nutrient runoff than either a 
fertiliser tax or a buffer-strip subsidy when used 
alone. Similar results were reported by Lankoski 
(2003). The studies by Lankoski were not based on 
measured N-leaching, but on a Danish leaching 
function estimated by Simmelsgaard (1991).
This  paper  introduces  a  new  contribution  in 
that it reports the inﬂuence of N-taxes, N-quotas or 
product  taxes  on  NO3-leaching  in  one  CEEC, 
Croatia, based on data from empirical experiments 
on N-response and NO3-leaching from the same 
experimental plots. The results from experimental 
conditions are calibrated against results from an 
on-farm survey of 20 family farms carried out in 
1999 and 2000 (Grgi´ c and Mesi´ c 2001). The paper 
is organised in the following way. Proﬁt-maximis-
ing N-doses on the basis of ﬁeld experiments (56 
observations) with maize are determined based on 
ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for proﬁt max-
imisation. This proﬁt-maximising N-dose is then 
compared  against  actual  N-fertiliser  use  on  the 
farms surveyed to see whether proﬁt-maximising 
levels  were  exceeded  or  not.  The  effects  of  a 
change  in  fertiliser  intensity  on  the  leaching  of 
NO3 is then established. In order to do this, an ef-
ﬂuent production function is estimated based upon 
the  N-concentration  in  lysimeter  water  for  the 
same treatment levels and soils as the N-response. 
The  effects  on  NO3-leaching  resulting  from  a 
change in proﬁt-maximising fertiliser intensity are 
then approximated by employing this efﬂuent pro-
duction function. The cost to farmers of imple-
menting a 50% fertiliser tax, a 100% product tax 
and a quota that corresponds to these taxes are then 
calculated. Next, the full social cost and the mar-
ginal costs of abatement are calculated. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn and recommendations for 
Croatian agriculture are made which would, if im-
plemented, reduce the threat of rising NO3 levels 
in groundwater.296
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Model
Doses  of  crop  nutrients,  especially  the  pure  N-
dose, have a major effect on both production and 
economic results as they affect maize and wheat 
production. In cases where a farmer uses excessive 
levels of N-fertilisers, such excessive use will re-
sult in both additional economic cost to him and 
the likelihood that N-leaching will increase. We 
therefore assume that the experimental conditions 
can be considered as a “suggested method of pro-
duction ”.
Although it is customary to assume that farm-
ers are proﬁt-maximizers, the optimising behav-
iour of farmers is subject to debate. Some evidence 
exists that farmers actually minimize costs rather 
than maximize proﬁts (Tauer 1995). It is also clear 
that expected proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms is far 
from trivial (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné 2001). 
In spite of this debate, for simplicity we have as-
sumed that farmers maximize expected proﬁts. N-
fertiliser is the only input to be considered in the 
proﬁt function and it is assumed that N-fertilisa-
tion only affects returns through higher yields, not 
through protein content. The farmer’s proﬁt func-
tion can be written as a short-term proﬁt function 
(e.g. Varian 1992):
 
π (p, w) = Ma
x≥0x π (pf (x) – wx),  (1)
where    π = proﬁt
  p = price of y
  y = f (x) = production function
  x = quantity of N – fertilisers applied
  w = price of N – fertiliser input
The proﬁt function π (p, w) in (1) is the indirect 
objective function of the farmer. Its value is always 
the maximum value of proﬁts given w and p, when 
proﬁt-maximising  levels  of  input  x*  have  been 
substituted back into the proﬁt function.
Assume a ﬁnancial incentive or economic in-
strument, denoted k, corresponding to: A (an N-
fertiliser tax); B (a product tax); or C (a non-uni-
form fertiliser quota). If k is an N-fertiliser tax kf t, 
rewriting (1) and taking the ﬁrst-order conditions 
for proﬁt maximisation gives
f' (x) =
  w (1 + kf t) 
.  (2)   p
Correspondingly, if k is a product tax kpt, taking 
ﬁrst-order conditions gives
f' (x) =
   w
  (3)
  p (1 – kpt)
.
Finally, if k is a quota, (1) should be written as
π (p, w) = pf (∞x) – w∞∞x.  (4)
and the optimisation problem for the farmer can be 
stated as a constrained maximisation problem, i.e. 
to maximise the Lagrangian:
L =
 
pf (x) – wx + λ (∞∞x – x)
subject to:
∂L  
= pf'(x) – w – λ = 0  (5)
∂x
f'(x) =
 w + λ 
.
  p
In other words, comparing the instruments A, 
B, and C is equivalent to comparing (2), (3), and 
(5) in a situation where w + kf t = p – kpt = λ. We 
denote w1
k as (w + kf t) and p1
k as (p – kpt). Proﬁt-
maximising input levels will adjust to a new level 
xf* = x (p, w1
k) in the case of fertiliser taxes, and to 
xp* = x (p1
k, w) in the case of product taxes. By set-
ting equation (2) equal to equation (3) one obtains 
the  equivalence  between  fertiliser  tax  and  the 
product price, i.e 
kpt =
  kf t
  1 + kf t .
Modifying work by Shortle and Abler (1997) 
and Horan and Shortle (2001), the ambient con-
centration for non-point-source pollution can be 
written as:
a = a (r, b, v, q)  (6)
where a is the ambient concentration (NO3-con-
centration),  r  is  a  vector  representing  leaching 
from non-point-sources, b is natural generation of 
the pollutant, v is precipitation and q is a vector of 
watershed  characteristics.  Efﬂuent  production 
(NO3-leaching) is given by:297
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r = g (x, v, s)  (7)
where x represents the quantity of fertiliser as stat-
ed before and s is soil type.
Since the ﬁnancial incentive k only affects ef-
ﬂuents, its effect on ambient concentration is given 
by  
da  
=
  ∂a  ∂r
dk  ∂r  ∂k  
,
where d denotes the total derivative and ∂ denotes 
a partial derivative.
The effect of an N-taxes or producer tax on 
ambient concentration will be: 
da  
=
 ∂g (x (p, w, k), v, s)
dk  ∂k   
.  (8)
 
Given that environmental consequences (both 
physical  and  economic)  depend  on  the  ambient 
concentration, the economic cost of damage from 
non-point-sources is given by D (a). It is a function 
that increases at a growing rate with increasing 
levels of the ambient pollutant.
The abatement cost is a social cost per unit of 
abatement. The MAC are the marginal social cost 
per unit of marginal abatement. The social cost can 
be thought of as the reduction in net income for 
farmers which has been adjusted by removing the 
cost inﬂuence of taxes arising from the ﬁnancial 
incentive k (in principle, the taxes could be paid 
back to farmers in the form of direct subsidies or 
agri-environmental payments). A similar measure 
was used by Vatn et al. (1997). The MAC for the 
economic instrument k will be: 
MAC =
  ∂
m
∑
i=1
πi (p, w, k) / ∂k
  ∂r / ∂k  (9)
Put more simply, the MAC for reducing leach-
ing by applying the ﬁnancial-tax-policy incentive 
k are equal to the relationship between the mar-
ginal social cost and the reduced amount of leach-
ing. A lump sum tax could be considered as repre-
senting  transaction  costs  arising  from  the  tax 
scheme. A lump sum tax does not however affect 
the MAC.
r = g (x, v, s) increases at an accelerating rate 
with respect to x (i.e. r'>0, r''>0) except for very 
low values of x. MAC are therefore non-constant, 
suggesting that small reductions in x result in low 
MAC, while large reductions give higher MAC.
A cost-efﬁcient policy is one where the MAC 
for different measures, evaluated at their optimum 
should be equal. Hence, MAC provide information 
on how large reductions in fertilisation rates should 
be before other measures (like support for catch 
crops, catchment dams or buffer strips) should be 
considered.
In order to estimate (9), assumptions concern-
ing the forms of the production functions and the 
efﬂuent-production function must be made. Poly-
nomial forms of the production functions (quad-
ratic and square root) have often been assumed 
when describing the N-response (e.g. by Heady 
and Dillon 1961, Laurila 1992, Bakken and Rom-
stad 1992). Paris (1992) suggested the Mitscher-
lich function as the appropriate functional form of 
the  N-response.  In  the  present  study,  quadratic, 
square-root  and  Mitscherlich  functions  were  all 
initially assumed. A comparison between the poly-
nomial and Mitscherlich functional forms of the 
N-response has also been made in a number of 
other  studies  (Sumelius  1993,  Bäckman  et  al. 
1997). The three forms of the production function 
and  corresponding  ﬁrst-order  conditions  (FOC) 
are presented in Table 3. For all of them, y'>0, 
y''<0, i.e. they are characterised by the law of di-
minishing returns.
The efﬂuent production function in (7) will in-
ﬂuence the MAC in (9). How can an appropriate 
form of the efﬂuent-production function (i.e. an 
NO3-leakage  function)  be  selected?  As  already 
noted, it might be thought that NO3-leaching is an 
increasing function that is related to increasing N-
input levels (x) in grain production. As pointed out 
by Vatn et al. (1996), the NO3-leaching function 
initially decreases for very low levels of N (lower 
than 3 g Nm-2). The explanation for this is that if 
yield growth is low because of low N-input, this 
prevents nutrient uptake. Vatn et al. also note that 
this reduction may be of nothing more than aca-
demic interest, since grain cropping without ferti-
lisers is relatively rare. At levels above 6 g Nm-2, 
NO3-leaching is seen to rise substantially with in-
creasing N-levels, with a positive second deriva-298
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tive (r''>0). This is the starting point for selecting 
the  functional  form  of  the  efﬂuent-production 
function.
Several  sophisticated  simulation  models  for 
describing NO3-leaching now exist. This raises the 
issue of using simulation models instead of an ef-
ﬂuent-production function approach. In an article 
developing an empirical model for the estimation 
of  NO3-leaching,  Simmelsgaard  and  Djurhuus 
(1998) develop an empirical model for the estima-
tion of NO3-leaching. They provide a good argu-
ment for using leaching functions based on less-
complicated models which rely on the use of re-
gression analysis. In many cases, they argue, the 
more complex models are of limited use because 
of their data requirements concerning climate and 
the chemical and physical properties of the soil. 
Such models are therefore best employed for re-
search and in speciﬁc areas where the data require-
ments can be fulﬁlled. In situations where actual 
empirical data on NO3-leaching exists, it may be 
sufﬁcient to assume a simple form of efﬂuent-pro-
duction function and then to estimate this. Sim-
melsgaard and Djurhuus propose a simple empiri-
cal model which incorporates only the short-term 
effects of an N-fertiliser rate and is based on rela-
tively-small quantities of data on NO3-leaching. 
The model proposed by Simmelsgaard and Djurh-
uus is for use in situations where existing data on 
NO3-leaching is lacking, and in situations when 
expected values of NO3-leaching cannot be calcu-
lated by using other models. The two basic models 
are  based  on  a  logarithmic  regression  in  which 
NO3-leaching is the dependent variable: 
ln (rcrop,year(crop),location) =  
α + α1Ncrop,year(crop),location + εcrop,year(crop),location  (10)
or:
ln (rcrop,year(crop),location) = β + β1Ncrop,year(crop),location
+ β1Nr
crop,year(crop),location + β2 ln 
  Da  
   Dnorm 
+ εcrop,year(crop),location  (11)
r = NO3-leaching, kg NO3ha-1 per year
Nr =  actual  N-fertilisation  divided  economi-
cally-optical N-fertilisation (1N)
Da = drainage from the root zone, mm year-1
Dnorm = average normal drainage from the root 
zone, mm year-1
αi, βi = the coefﬁcient ts to be estimated
  
According to Simmelsgaard and Djurhuus, 
the logarithmic transformation was used to obtain 
constant  variance  and  would  therefore  seem  to 
have been applied because of problems with data. 
Furthermore, it was noted that the NO3-leaching 
function decreases at very low levels of N. Conse-
quently, a square-root functional form would be 
better able to capture this fact than model (10) or 
(11). For this reason, a model according to (12):
rcrop,year(crop),location = β + β1√Ncrop,year(crop),location
 
+
β2Ncrop,year(crop),location + δ1D1 + δ2D2 + δ3D3 +
εcrop,year(crop),location   (12)
where
r = NO3–N, mg l-1
N = N-fertilisation, kg ha-1
D1 – D3 = dummies for year (4 years)
βi, δi = coefﬁcients to be estimated
was assumed in this study (observe that r is meas-
ured as a concentration of NO3–N). The NO3-N-
leaching and N-response functions will be substi-
tuted back into (7) and (9) to ﬁnd the MAC. An-
nual dummies were included to take account of 
yearly variation. If the δi-coefﬁcients equal zero, 
the  correct  model  will  be  the  restricted  model 
(13):
rcrop,year(crop),location = β + β1√Ncrop,year(crop),location
 
+
β2Ncrop,year(crop),location + εcrop,year(crop),location   (13)
It is possible to test the null hypothesis that δ1 
= δ2 = δ3 = 0 in the unrestricted model (12) using 
an F-test or likelihood-ratio test. 299
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Material and methods
Field trial
With the aim of determining sustainable mineral 
N-rates for the fertilisation of major ﬁeld crops in 
central Croatia, a stationary ﬁeld trial with 10 treat-
ments in four replications was set up in the Lonja 
Field (Lonjsko polje) near Popovaca. In the ﬁrst 
(1996) and fourth investigation years (1999), maize 
was grown as a test crop on the trial area. Water 
leached through the soil to a depth of 80 cm was 
caught by installed lysimeters without lateral sides 
(after  Ebermayer).  The  trial  included  ten  treat-
ments, but only seven are taken into consideration 
in this analysis: 1. Check, 2. N0 PK, 3. N100 PK, 4. 
N150 PK, 5. N200 PK, 6. N250 PK, 7. N300PK. The trial 
plot size was 30 × 130 m (3900 m2). The omitted 
trial treatments included: 1. N250PK + phosphogyp-
sum (12 t ha-1); 2. N250PK + zeolite + CaCO3 (3 t 
ha-1); and 3. Black fallow. The reason for omitting 
these trials was that they could not be included in a 
production function which describes only the inﬂu-
ence on N. Fertilization of the maize crop was car-
ried out with 600 kg ha-1 of NPK 7-20-30, which 
amounted to 42 kg N, 120 kg phosphorus (P) and 
180 kg potassium (K). In the N0PK treatment, min-
eral fertilizers without N were applied. Of the total 
N-quantity, 60% was applied before planting and 
the remaining 40% was applied in two top dress-
ings, each of which was 20% of the total N-quan-
tity. Maize was sown on 18 May 1996. (hybrid 
ETA 272, population density 77,000 plants ha-1) 
and on 8 May 1999 (hybrid Bc 318, population 
density 69,000 plants ha-1). The N-content was de-
termined in soil samples, in lysimeter water and in 
plant material. The total number of observations 
was thus based on four replications, seven treat-
ments and two years, which gives n = 56.
Soil properties
The soil type at the experimental station is deﬁned 
as Stagnosol (ISSS 1994), with an Ach + Ecg – Ecg 
– Btg sequence of soil horizons. Its physical proper-
ties (high content of ﬁne sand, silt and clay) and 
chemical properties (calcium deﬁciency, low con-
tent of organic matter) mean that this soil is of a 
type  that  has  limited  fertility.  Intensive  mineral 
fertilisation  is  very  important  for  stable  arable 
farming in the given conditions. The soil is loam in 
the A and E horizons, and sandy clay loam in the B 
horizon. Soil reaction is acid in the topsoil and 
slightly acid in the Btg layer. There is low humus 
and medium N-content in the plough layer. The 
soil-supply of plant-available P is good, and the 
soil-supply of plant-available K is medium.
The NO3-N concentration in lysimeter water 
varied in accordance with the application time of 
mineral N-fertilizers, with temperature, and espe-
cially with the quantity and intensity of precipita-
tion. Values for the NO3-N concentration in lysim-
eter water and the quantity of water in the lysimeter 
were used to calculate the total NO3-N loss. The 
total number of observations was 40. Results based 
on  leaching  data  for  NO3-N  were  converted  to 
NO3-values after estimation.
Farm survey and area
The area in Croatia where the sample of 20 farms 
is located is situated close to Lonja ﬁeld (Lonjsko 
polje), which covers some 50,600 hectares of for-
est, pastures and meadows. Lonjsko polje Nature 
Park is the second-largest protected area in Croa-
tia. Because of the high levels of biodiversity, there 
are many reasons for conservation activities in this 
area. The climate of Lonja ﬁeld is typically conti-
nental. Major long-term (1965–1990) indicators of 
climatic conditions in the course of the investigation 
are shown in Table 1. It is worth noting that mean 
long-term precipitation totals 865 mm. The average 
temperature is 10.7°C.
Approximately 1600 family farms with an aver-
age of 3.3 hectares of agricultural land are engaged 
in agricultural production in this area. Only 10% of 
farmers own more than 7.5 hectares of land. Farms 
currently receive subsidies based on the area they 
cultivate. No cross-compliance between agronomic 
practices and acreage subsidies exist. Only a few of 
the farms have a high level of technology (Grgi´ c and 
Mesi´ c 2001).300
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The most important crops in the area are maize, 
winter wheat, red clover, and in some cases alfalfa. 
Despite the relatively-high doses of N-fertilisation, 
average yields for crops are low, particularly as re-
gards winter wheat and maize. Because of the very 
complex conditions existing in Croatian agriculture 
today, farmers desire higher yields, but their knowl-
edge concerning many important issues related to 
soil tillage, mineral and organic fertilisation, and the 
general improvement of soil fertility, can at best be 
described as “problematic”. In most cases, it is pos-
sible to speak about a remarkably-narrow crop rota-
tion, since maize and winter wheat are the most im-
portant crops. The relationship between ﬁelds under 
these two crops indicates that maize is often grown 
in short-term monoculture.
For the purposes of this study, we selected 20 
family farms as the targets for a survey concerning 
their capacities. The farms are typical as regards 
agricultural production in the region: 3–10 hec-
tares  of  maize  and  wheat  production. The  total 
seeded area of self-owned and rented land varied 
between 11 and 25 hectares, on average it was 16 
hectares. All  of  the  farms  had  livestock,  either 
dairy or beef cattle or pigs. To make the sample 
representative of the distribution of all farms in the 
area we used the following criteria for selecting 
sample farms: size of cultivated area, number of 
household members, crops cultivated, technology 
of production, yield level and inclusion in the sys-
tem of production supported by the Ministry of 
Agriculture.
As regards the surveyed farms, nutrient balances 
at farm level were calculated for all 20 farms based 
upon production results for the years 1999 and 2000. 
N-input in the form of artiﬁcial fertilisers was calcu-
lated and the prices paid for these fertilisers were 
collected. All prices are expressed in terms of values 
in October 2000 using an exchange rate of EUR 1 = 
KUN 7.60. The average prices obtained were, for 
maize  KUN 0.75  kg-1  (EUR 0.0987  kg-1)  and  for 
wheat KUN 1.05 kg-1 (EUR 0.138 kg-1). In addition 
to sales revenue, the producers received an area-
based subsidy equalling KUN 700 ha-1 in maize pro-
duction and KUN 1050 ha-1 in wheat production. 
Maize yields on the 20 surveyed farms were in the 
range 5130 to 6270 kg ha-1, and wheat yields ranged 
from 4218 to 5130 kg ha-1. In maize production, the 
20 farms used 206–230 kg ha-1 of pure N including 
manure. In wheat production they used 234–236 kg 
ha-1 of pure N including manure.
Results and discussion
N-response for maize
Based on the ﬁeld trials described earlier, the pro-
duction function (N-response) of maize was esti-
mated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (quad-
ratic and square-root forms) and Non-Linear Least 
Squares  (Mitscherlich  form)  using  the  Eviews 
software program Version 3.1. The results for the 
various speciﬁcations are presented as the response 
functions N-fertiliser-yield shown in Table 2.
There is no evidence that the central assump-
tions behind OLS would not be in accordance with 
the  estimated  results. All  in  all,  the  polynomial 
forms for estimating N-response for maize appear 
to work out well. All three functional forms seem 
Table 1. Precipitation and average air temperature during the period of investigation.
Year
Total monthly precipitation (mm) and average air temperature (°C)
Year
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
1996 mm 54 32 41 70 71 31 91 83 191 46 135 79 922
°C –0.6 –0.8 3.4 10.8 17.4 20.7 19.8 20.5 13.5 12.0 8.7 –1.4 10.3
1999 mm 42 63 38 126 107 89 86 66 95 73 92 104 980
°C 1.2 2.4 9.1 12.6 17.2 20.2 21.9 21.2 18.6 11.6 3.6 1.9 11.8
1965–1990
mm 53 51 59 73 80 90 77 85 80 63 87 65 865
°C –0.2 2.0 6.6 11.0 15.9 19.0 20.8 19.8 16.1 10.8 5.3 1.4 10.7301
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Table 2. Results for Ordinary Least Squares and Non-linear Least Squares estimations of maize nitrogen 
response (n = 56) and the NO3-N leaching function (n = 40).
Variable Coefﬁcient1) t-statistic Probability 
Quadratic function
β0 54.9450
(3.2033)
17.153 0.0000
β1 0.2914
(0.0539)
5.411 0.0000
β2 –0.0005
(0.0002)
–2.775 0.0076
∞R2 0.6247
White heteroscedasticty test: F-stat 0.3474
Square root function
β0 55.0666
(3.2931)
16.722 0.0000
β1 2.6256
(1.0619)
2.4724 0.0167
β2 –0.0073
(0.0652)
–0.112 0.9110
∞R2 0.6146
White heteroscedasticty test: F-stat 0.2622
Mitscherlich function
M 103.3900
(9.9061)
10.437 0.0000
K 0.4680
(0.0558)
8.389 0.0000
β –0.0071
(0.0034)
2.100 0.0405
∞R2 0.6213
White heteroscedasticty test: F-stat 0.4953
Leaching function (Efﬂuent-production function)
α0 6.396
(1.835)
3.486 0.0013
β1 –2.124
(0.692)
–3.071 0.0040
β2 0.207
(0.043)
4.834 0.0000
∞R2 0.680
1) Standard error in parenthesis.
to describe the N-response for maize in a satisfac-
tory manner, and the goodness of ﬁt is almost iden-
tical. The response functions estimated by OLS for 
maize appear satisfactory. Estimating the Mitscher-
lich functions with non-linear least squares also 
gave  satisfactory  results  with  respect  to  hetero-
scedasticity. The ﬁnal criterion for choosing the 
Mitscherlich functional form is based on a theo-
retical viewpoint. It has been shown that this func-
tional form accords best with the von Liebig hy-
pothesis  known  as  the  “Law  of  the  Minimum” 
(Paris 1992a, b, Sumelius 1993)1.
1 It should be noted that in the ﬁnal estimates of MAC, 
the selection of functional form had only a minor inﬂu-
ence.302
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It may be added that initially, a data set for 
wheat similar to that of maize was used to estimate 
N-response  functions  but  heteroscedasticity  was 
found to be a problem. It was therefore decided 
that the winter wheat response function should be 
excluded from our analysis. The results obtained 
based on these excluded functions were similar to 
the results presented here. 
Proﬁt-maximising N-fertiliser level
Optimal N-fertiliser levels for proﬁt maximisation 
in maize cultivation stipulated by the ﬁrst-order 
conditions of proﬁt maximisation for the Mitscher-
lich speciﬁcation are presented in Table 3. 
Proﬁt-maximizing levels for the quadratic and 
square-root forms are also presented in this table. 
The prices for N-fertiliser used in the calculation, in 
maize production KUN 7.62 (kg N)-1 (EUR 1.00 (kg 
N)-1), were the prices producers paid for N-fertilis-
ers in October 2000 as determined by our farm sur-
vey. Second-order conditions for a maximum were 
satisﬁed in all cases. According to the Mitscherlich 
function, the proﬁt-maximising dose in maize pro-
duction is 171.7 kg N ha-1 and the corresponding 
yield level would be 8904 kg maize ha-1. Enforcing 
an N-fertiliser tax of 100%, or a product tax of 50% 
would  reduce  the  proﬁt-maximising  dose  by  ap-
proximately 98 kg N ha-1.  If such a tax were to be 
implemented, the yield level would fall by 1434 kg 
ha-1, and the gross margin would fall by EUR 43 
ha-1.
Do farmers exceed proﬁt-maximising 
levels of N-fertilisation?
Farmers in the surveyed sample used N-fertiliser 
doses of 206–230 kg N ha-1 when the manure em-
ployed was taken into account. In other words, the 
Croatian farmers in this sample appear to use high-
er-than-optimal levels of N when the N contributed 
by manure is taken into account. If only the N in 
artiﬁcial fertilisers is counted, farmers used an N-
input  (161 kg  N  ha-1)  close  to  the  optimal  level. 
Could  farmers  possibly  increase  their  proﬁts  by 
lowering levels of N intensity? This is not necessar-
ily the case. One possible explanation for the high-
er-than-optimal N-input is that the technology used 
by farmers when spreading manure does not allow 
them to use the N-input of manure in an efﬁcient 
manner. Only a part of the manure’s N-content will 
Table 3. Alternative functional forms of the N-response curve for maize, corresponding proﬁt-maximising fertiliser 
doses, levels of yield, and the impact of a 100% fertiliser tax or 50% product tax on fertiliser dosage.
Functional form First-order condition Proﬁt 
maximising 
fertiliser  
doses, kg ha-1 
Yield, kg ha-1 Return after 
subtraction of 
fertiliser cost, 
euro kg-1 ha-1
Proﬁt maximising fertiliser 
doses, kg ha-1 with 100% 
N-fertiliser tax or 50% 
product-price tax
Quadratic
y = β0 + β1x + β2x2
  w – β1
x* =  p
    2β2
185.0 9,130 715 86
Square root
y = β0 + β1x1/2 + β2x
  w – β2 
x* =  p  
     β1  
      2  
145.3 8,565 700 39
Mitcherlich
y = m(1 – ke-βx)  
  ln  pmkβ 
       w  
x* =       β
171.7 8,904 707 74303
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actually be available to the plant when the need for 
it is at a maximum. If this is the case, a rational 
farmer will base his fertilising decision on the N-
input achieved using artiﬁcial fertilisers. In other 
words, when estimating proﬁt-maximising doses 
on the basis of what is possible in N-response ex-
periments, farmers appear to be optimising their 
N-input. On the other hand, the yield level achiev-
able at the proﬁt-maximising intensity level in ex-
perimental conditions is considerably higher (3100–
3800 kg ha-1) than the maize yields actually achieved 
on farms. As the use of N-fertilisers and manure on 
the studied farms does not result in adequate yields, 
it would appear that factors other than nutrient in-
put are restricting yields. Given these low yields, 
farmers are not optimising either N-fertilisation or 
cropping practices. One consequence is that farm-
ers could choose between two options to increase 
their proﬁts: 1) Attempt to inﬂuence the growth 
factors that restrict yields, thereby utilising the N-
input of both artiﬁcial fertilizers and manure more 
efﬁciently; or 2) Reduce levels of nutrient intensi-
ty. From an environmental point of view, both op-
tions would make good sense. While changing the 
functional form to a quadratic or a square-root form 
changes the optimal N-fertiliser doses and corre-
sponding  yields  to  some  extent,  the  conclusions 
drawn remain unchanged.
Efﬂuent production function
The  efﬂuent-production  function  (leakage  func-
tion) was estimated in both its unrestricted (12) 
and restricted form (13). The restrictions of (13) 
were tested. It was found that the null hypothesis 
of the dummies being zero (H0 = δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = 0) 
could not be rejected using either the F-test or on 
the basis of the log-likelihood ratio. The estimated 
leakage function should not therefore include dum-
mies. The estimation result for the NO3-N-leakage 
function according to (13) is presented in the lower 
part of Table 2.
All the estimated coefﬁcients are highly sig-
niﬁcant (signiﬁcance level of P<0.01 or P<0.001). 
The adjusted coefﬁcient of determination (0.68) 
indicates that goodness of ﬁt of the leakage func-
tion  was  rather  good,  given  that  the  data  was 
pooled. The assumption of homoscedastic errors 
could not be rejected on the basis of the White test. 
The estimated restricted leaching function is pre-
sented in Figure 1.
It is interesting that NO3-leaching initially ap-
pears to fall. This phenomenon can be attributed to 
the fact that a growing crop takes up more nutri-
ents than a weak crop. A small amount of fertiliser 
will therefore reduce leaching because of the in-
crease in crop growth. As a consequence, NO3-
leaching initially falls, reaching its lowest limit at 
a fertiliser input of 26 kg N ha-1. At the proﬁt-max-
imising  level  of  fertiliser  intensity  (171.7 kg  N 
ha-1) the amount of leached NO3 is estimated to be 
62.11 mg NO3l-1. This is an amount exceeding the 
critical level stipulated by the Nitrate Directive (50 
mg NO3 l-1). The claim that NO3-levels in ground-
water are critically high in some areas in Croatia is 
supported  by  this  estimate  (Romic  et  al.  1997, 
Tomic et al. 1997, Simunic et al. 1998, Klacic et al. 
1999).
Altering the functional form of the N-response 
function for maize results in slight changes to the 
values  for  leached  NO3.  The  proﬁt-maximising 
doses indicated by the square-root form changed 
the value for NO3-leaching to 47.8 mg NO3 l-1 and 
the corresponding doses for the quadratic form re-
sulted in NO3-leakage of 69.6 mg NO3 l-1.
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Fig.  1.  Estimated  restricted  leaching  function,  leached 
NO3 mg l-1. NO3-N leakage has been converted into NO3-
leakage using the conversion factor 4.427.304
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Total and marginal abatement costs
The estimated total abatement costs for a given 
level of NO3 reduction through the ﬁnancial incen-
tive k are shown in Table 4. Conversion of NO3-N 
to NO3 is achieved by multiplying the former by a 
conversion factor of 4.427. The N-response curve 
for yields is based on the Mitscherlich speciﬁca-
tion.
A 100% N-tax or a 50% product tax will lead 
to NO3-leaching being reduced to 47.16 mg NO3 
l-1. Noteworthy is the fact that the total abatement 
cost for an N-fertiliser tax would be EUR –0.649 
(mg NO3 l-1)-1, indicating a net return to society. 
This means a fertiliser tax would generate a net 
social beneﬁt even when the value of the resulting 
environmental improvement is not taken into ac-
count. An N-tax of 50% could be introduced, the 
tax revenue could be directed back to farmers and 
society would still be better off. For the product 
tax and for the N-quota, the total abatement cost 
would be EUR 0.921 (mg NO3 l-1)-1 indicating a 
real cost. The N-tax appears to have a lower total 
abatement cost for society than either the N-quota 
or the product tax. The product tax and the N-quo-
ta  are  equally  efﬁcient  (assuming  no  costs  for 
monitoring or information). The relative efﬁciency 
of these two instruments therefore depend on fac-
tors that lie outside this analysis. While the order 
of these instruments is hardly surprising, the mag-
nitude of the difference is, however, quite signiﬁ-
cant. Ordering of the instruments is not dependent 
upon speciﬁcation of the N-response function.
It may be noted that direct comparison between 
the abatement costs for a fertiliser tax that are re-
ported in this study and estimates by Lankoski and 
Ollikainen (1999) and Vatn et al. (1997) is difﬁ-
cult. The reason is that those studies reported the 
costs of reduced leaching as an amount of money 
per area unit while the measure used in the present 
study is an amount of money per concentration. A 
reliable comparison of leaching in terms of N kg 
ha-1 would require data on water leachate amounts 
for every particular outﬂow.
To establish how large reductions in N-fertilis-
ers  should  be  achieved  through  N-taxes  before 
considering other measure, the MAC of the N-tax 
must be examined. Figure 2 illustrates the MAC 
for various levels of N-taxes and the consequent 
marginal reduction in NO3-leaching.
The ﬁgure shows that MAC are non-constant, 
which suggests that small reductions in fertilisa-
tion rates result in small MAC while large reduc-
tions give rise to higher MAC. In fact, MAC are 
actually negative up to an N-tax level of approxi-
mately 60%, indicating no costs to society up to 
this level (although the gross margins of farmers 
are  reduced,  i.e.  the  income  distribution  will 
change as a result). At N-tax levels above 100%, 
MAC  appear  to  increase  rapidly  while  NO3 l-1-
leaching falls at a diminishing rate. The MAC im-
plied  by  a  product  tax  and  an  N-quota  show  a 
similar increasing trend although they, contrary to 
the N-tax, remain positive at small abatement lev-
els. An N-tax of 60% corresponds to a proﬁt-maxi-
mizing fertilization level of approximately 105 kg 
N ha-1. The fact that an N-tax of 60% yields a so-
cial return indicates that reductions in fertilisation 
implemented through N-taxes should be achieved 
to this level before social planners should consider 
other measures (such as support for catch crops, 
buffer strips or catchment dams).
Table 4. Abatement cost of economic instruments for a 50% N-tax, a 100% product-price tax or an N-quota. 
N-fertiliser tax Product tax N-Quota
Reduction in leaching (mg NO3 l-1) 47.16 47.16 47.16
Abatement cost (€/mg NO3 l-1) –0.649 0.921 0.921
Reduction in private gross margin (€ ha-1) 117.44 412.06 43.42
Reduction in private gross margin (€/mg NO3 l-1) 2.49 8.74 0.921
New leaching level (mg NO3 l-1) 14.95 14.95 14.95305
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For levels of total reduction below 50 mg NO3 
l-1, MAC for the N-tax are smaller than for both the 
product tax and the N-quota. For levels of total re-
duction below 20 mg NO3 l-1, MAC for the N-quo-
ta are lower than MAC for the product tax. How-
ever, if NO3-leaching is reduced more than 20 mg 
NO3  l-1,  the  order  changes:  the  product  tax  has 
higher MAC than the N-quota for levels of NO3-
leaching reduction higher than this.
Conclusions
When using the prices for maize and N obtained in 
the sample, proﬁt-maximising levels of fertilisa-
tion in maize production were estimated to be in 
the range 145–185 kg N ha-1 depending upon spec-
iﬁcation of the crop response. Using the theoreti-
cally-superior functional form leads to proﬁt-max-
imising N-doses of approximately 171.7 kg N-1. 
Corresponding NO3-levels in waters were estimat-
ed to be 62 mg NO3 l-1 at this level of fertiliser in-
tensity. This NO3-level is above the critical level 
stipulated by the Nitrate Directive (50 mg NO3 l-1). 
The  average  N  applied  as  mineral  fertiliser  by 
farmers in the sample, 161 kg N ha-1, was close to 
the  estimated  proﬁt-maximising  N-dose.  Corre-
sponding NO3 levels in the water is estimated to be 
56 mg NO3 l-1, or slightly above what the Nitrate 
Directive deﬁnes as the critical maximum level. If 
account is taken of the N-content in manure which 
farmers apply to their ﬁelds, the total N-dose actu-
ally applied increases to 206–230 kg N ha-1 de-
pending upon the farm. The corresponding esti-
mate for the NO3 l-1 level in groundwater is then in 
the range 82–96 mg NO3l-1, or some 1.6–1.9 times 
higher than the critical maximum level deﬁned in 
the Nitrate Directive.
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The  possible  yield  level  obtained  in  experi-
mental conditions at proﬁt-maximising N-intensity 
levels was estimated to be 8904 kg maize ha-1, 
3100–3800 kg ha-1 higher than levels recorded on 
the farms in the sample. The use of mineral fertilis-
ers  and  manure  on  the  sample  farms  does  not 
therefore  currently  appear  to  lead  to  adequate 
yields.  The  excess  nutrients  are  susceptible  to 
leaching, placing an unnecessary burden both the 
surface and underground waters in the area which 
may have extensive long-term effects. To increase 
their proﬁts, farmers have two options: 1 Attempt 
to  inﬂuence  growth  factors  that  are  restricting 
yields, thereby utilising the N-input of both artiﬁ-
cial fertilizers and manure more efﬁciently, 2. Re-
duce  levels  of  nutrient  intensity.  Both  actions 
would reduce NO3-leaching.
One way of attempting to inﬂuence NO3-leach-
ing is by the application of economic instruments 
which reduce it. In this study, three economic in-
struments  for  reducing  NO3-leaching  were  ana-
lysed: a fertiliser tax, a product tax and a fertiliser 
quota corresponding to both of these taxes. A 100% 
N-tax or a 50% product tax would reduce proﬁt-
maximising  N-doses  to  approximately  74  kg  N 
ha-1 (a reduction of 98 kg ha-1), and should reduce 
NO3 levels from 62.11 mg NO3 l-1 to 14.95 mg NO3 
l-1). This is a leaching reduction of 47.16 mg NO3 
l-1 (i.e. 76%). At this abatement level the N-tax has 
the lowest total abatement cost, EUR –0.649 (mg 
NO3 l-1)-1 and indicates a net social return. Both a 
product tax and an N-quota would have a high 
abatement cost of EUR 0.921 (mg NO3 l-1)-1).
The estimated MAC for all the instruments are 
non-constant and increase at a growing rate. MAC 
for  N-taxes  are  positive  for  N-taxes  lower  than 
60%, indicating a net return to society without tak-
ing  into  account  improvement  in  water  quality. 
This implies that an N-tax of up to 60% provides a 
social return and indicates that reduction rates in 
fertilisation up to this level should be accomplished 
before considering governmental support for other 
measures  (such  as  catch  crops,  buffer  strips  or 
catchment dams).
MAC for the N-tax are smaller than they are 
for both the product tax and the N-quota in the rel-
evant  range  of  NO3-leaching  reduction.  While 
MAC for the N-quota are lower than MAC for the 
product tax when total reduction levels are below 
20 mg NO3 l-1, for reduction levels above this the 
order of the two instruments is reversed.
Since yields in Croatia are relatively modest, 
other crop-husbandry practices than N-fertilisation 
may be constraining factors as regards yield in-
crease. If these factors could be identiﬁed, an eco-
nomically-optimal level of yield corresponding to 
the actual use of N might be accomplished, and 
NO3-leaching would be correspondingly reduced. 
It is quite likely that the technology used by farm-
ers is not as efﬁcient as the technology used in the 
ﬁeld trials, and in spite of using proﬁt-maximising 
N-fertiliser doses, farmers will not reach adequate 
levels of yield in maize production. What are these 
limiting  factors? They  should  be  sought  in  ele-
ments connected with soil cultivation, crop protec-
tion and crop rotation. It would probably be fairly 
easy to identify some measures which could be im-
plemented in a relatively-short time period. Such 
measures encompass a large range of factors: ra-
tional technology and the current incentives for 
their  use  in  production,  fertilisation  and  liming 
based on soil analysis, improvement in the soil-
tillage  system,  changes  in  crop  rotation  with  a 
higher  proportion  of  leguminous  plants,  proper 
drainage, change in the system of support for pro-
ducers and applying adequate technological proce-
dures in harmony with appropriate soil manage-
ment. Other measures will take longer. Long-term 
changes should focus on determination of the ba-
sic indicators for soil sustainability in the area, as 
well as on the determination of true production ca-
pacities, and a favourable allocation of production 
according to the principles of soil sustainability. If 
these agronomic principles were to be applied in 
practice (e.g. by cross-compliance stipulating the 
use of good agricultural practices), current N-lev-
els would be utilised in a more rational manner.
Finally, from the agronomic point of view it is 
essential to educate farmers about the vital impor-
tance of fertilisation which is based on adequate 
soil analysis. Research activities should be orient-
ed toward a detailed determination of the basic in-
dicators for soil sustainability in this area, and de-
termination of true production capacities should be 307
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harmonised with the requirements of sustainable 
soil management. Results obtained in detailed re-
search over extended periods suggest there is a 
need to create a computer model which incorpo-
rates contemporary science, professional practice, 
and methodology, in order to determine the impact 
of agricultural production on both surface water 
and groundwater. Such a model should also result 
in a favourable allocation of production for the uti-
lisation of the area on soil sustainability-principles 
and also contribute to maintaining population lev-
els in this rural location.
Acknowledgements. The authors are grateful for valuable 
suggestions regarding this paper from two anonymous ref-
erees as well as for helpful comments from Stefan Bäck-
man, Markku Ollikainen and Timo Sipiläinen (University 
of Helsinki). Work on which this paper is based was car-
ried  out  within  the  EU’s  CEESA  project  QLK5-1999-
01611, Fifth Framework Programme in cooperation with 
FAO Sub regional Ofﬁce for Central and Eastern Europe.
References
Andréasson, I.-M. 1990. Costs for reducing farmers’ use of 
nitrogen in Gotland, Sweden. Ecological Economics 2: 
287–299.
Bäckman, S., Vermeulen, S. & Taavitsainen, V.-M. Long-
term fertilizer ﬁeld trials: comparison of three mathe-
matical response models. Agricultural and Food Sci-
ence in Finland 6: 151–160.
Bakken, L. & Romstad, E. 1992. Avlingskurver og variasjon 
– nye perspektiver. In: Avlingskurver. Økonomiske og 
naturvitenskaplige  perspektiver.  Report  from  Depart-
ment of Economy and Social Sciences, Norwegian Ag-
ricultural University, Ås. p. 91–107.
Baumol, W.J. & Oates, W.E. 1988. The theory of environ-
mental  policy.  2nd  ed.  USA:  Cambridge  University 
Press. 296 p.
Bijl, G. van der, Zeijts, H. van & Knickel, K. 1999. Nitrogen 
problems and current policies. In: Zeijts, H. van (ed.). 
Economic instruments for nitrogen control in European 
agriculture. Utrecht, Netherlands: CLM. p. 5–26.
Bleken, M.A. & Bakken, L.R. 1997. The anthropogenic nitro-
gen cycle in Norway. In: Romstad, E. et al. (eds.). Con-
trolling  mineral  emissions  in  European  agriculture. 
Economics, policies and the environment. UK: CAB in-
ternational. p. 27–40.
Braden, J.B & Segerson, K. 1993. Information problems in 
the design of nonpoint sources pollution policy. In: Rus-
sell, C.S. & Shogren (eds.). Theory, modeling and expe-
rience in the management of nonpoint source pollution. 
Boston, USA:  Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 1–36.
Brouwer, F. & Hellegers, P. 1997. Nitrogen ﬂows at farm 
level across European Union agriculture. In: Romstad, 
E. et al. (eds.). Controlling mineral emissions in Euro-
pean agriculture. Economics, policies and the environ-
ment. UK: CAB international. p. 11–26.
De Clercq, Gertsis, A.C., Hofman, G., Jarvis, S.C., Neete-
son, J.J. & Sinabell, F. (eds.). 2001. Nutrient manage-
ment legislation in European countries. Netherlands: 
Wageningen Pres. 340 p.
Directive 91/676/EEC. Council Directive of 12 December 
1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollu-
tion caused by nitrates from agricultural sources.
Gabel, H.L. & Sinclair-Desgagné, B. 2000. The ﬁrm its pro-
cedures  and  win-win  environmental  regulations.  In: 
Frontiers of environmental economics. UK: Edward El-
gars p. 148–175.
Goodchild, R.G. 1998. EU policies for the reduction of nitro-
gen in water: the example of the Nitrates Directive. En-
vironmental pollution 102, S1: 737–740.
Granstedt, A. 2000. Increasing the efﬁciency of plant nutri-
ent recycling within the agricultural system as a way of 
reducing the load to the environment – experience from 
Sweden and Finland. Agriculture, Ecosystems and En-
vironment 1570: 1–17.
Gren, I.-M., Elofsson, K. & Jannike, P. 1997. Cost-effective 
nutrient reduction to the Baltic Sea. Environmental and 
Resource Economics 10: 341–362.
Grgi´ c, Z. & Mesi´ c, M. 2001. Analysis of environmental im-
pact  of  farming  systems  in  Lonja  ﬁeld,  Croatia.  In: 
Bäckman, S. et al. (eds.). Analysis of environmental im-
pact of farming systems in ﬁve Central and Eastern 
European  countries.  D7  Report  of  the  Central  and 
Eastern Sustainable Agriculture (CEESA), Project sub-
mitted to the EU Commission. Helsinki, University of 
Helsinki. p. 37–49.
Grifﬁn, R.L. & Bromley, D.W. 1982. Agricultural runoff as a 
nonpoint externality: a theoretical development. Ameri-
can Journal of Agricultural Economics 64, 3: 547–552.
Hanley, N. 1990. The economics of nitrate pollution. Europe-
an Review of Agricultural Economics 17, 2: 129–151.
Hanley, N. 2001. Policy on agricultural pollution in the Euro-
pean Union. In: Shortle, J.S. & Abler, D. (eds.). Environ-
mental  policies  for  agricultural  pollution  control.  UK: 
CABI Publishing. p. 151–162.
Horan,  R.D.  &  Shortle,  J.S.  2001.  Environmental  instru-
ments for agriculture. In: Shortle, J.S. & Abler, D. (eds.). 
Environmental policies for agricultural pollution control. 
UK: CABI Publishing. p. 19–65.
ISSS 1994. International Society of Soil Science, ISRIC In-
ternational  Soil  Reference  and  Information  Centre, 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 1994. World Reference Base for Soil Resourc-
es, Draft. Wageningen/Rome.
Jansson, B.-0. 1997. The Baltic Sea: current and future sta-
tus and impact of agriculture. Ambio 26, 7: 424–431.
Klacic, Z., Petosic, D. &Coga, L. 1999. Nitrate leaching in 
different  pipe  drainage  distances,  Agriculturae  Con-
spectus Scientiﬁcus 63, Supplement 4: 331–338.
Lankoski, J. 2000. The cost-effectiveness of agri-environ-
mental policy mixes in reducing nutrient runoffs. Licen-308
A G R I C U L T U R A L  A N D  F O O D  S C I E N C E
Sumelius, J. et al. Marginal abatement costs for reducing leaching of nitrates in agriculture
tiate thesis. Agricultural Economics Research Institute. 
49 p.
Lankoski, J. 2003. The environmental dimension of multi-
functionality:  economic  analysis  and  implications  for 
policy design. MTT Agrifood Research Finland. Agri-
food Research reports 20. 107 p. (Doctoral disserta-
tion).
Lankoski, J. & Ollikainen, M. 1999. The environmental ef-
fectiveness of alternative agri-environmental policy re-
forms: theoretical and empirical analysis. Agricultural 
and Food Science in Finland 8: 321–331.
Mesi´ c, M., Butorac, A., Basic, F., Gaspar, I. & Kisic, I. 1997. 
Inﬂuence of mineral nitrogen rates on nitrate leaching 
from drained pseudogley. In: 7th Gumpensteiner Lysi-
metertagung. Lysimeter und nachhaltige Landnutzung, 
Bal Gumpenstein, Austria. p. 169–170.
Mesi´ c, M., Butorac, A., Basic, F., Kisic, I. & Gaspar, I. 2000. 
Inﬂuence of black fallow on nitrate leaching. In: Pro-
ceedings of 15th ISTRO Conference. Fort Worth, Dal-
las, USA. p. 7.
Paris, Q. 1992a. The return of von Liebig’s “Law of the min-
imum”. Agronomy Journal 84, 6: 1040–1046.
Paris, Q. 1992b. The von Liebig hypothesis. American Jour-
nal of Agricultural Economics 474, 4: 1019–1028.
Ribaudo, M. 2001. Non-point source pollution control policy 
in the USA. In: Shortle, J.S. & Abler, D. (eds.). Environ-
mental  policies  for  agricultural  pollution  control.  UK: 
CABI Publishing. p. 123–149.
Ribaudo, M. & Shortle, J.S. 2001. Estimating beneﬁts and 
costs of pollution control policies. In: Shortle, J.S. & 
Abler, D. (eds.). Environmental policies for agricultural 
pollution control. UK: CABI Publishing. p. 85–122.
Rougoor, C.W., Zeijts, H. van, Hofreiter, M.F. & Bäckman, S. 
2001. Experiences with fertilizer taxes in Europe. Jour-
nal of Environmental Planning and Management 44, 6: 
877–887.
Romic, D., Romic, M., Klacic, Z., Petosic, D. & Stricevic, I. 
1997. Effect of land use upon the leaching of nitrogen 
into groundwater in the area of the future water pump-
ing station. In: Gumpensteiner Lysimetertagung. Lysi-
meter und Nachhaltige Landnutzung Bal Gumpenstein, 
Austria.
Shortle, J.S. 1996. Economic incentives for nutrient pollu-
tion reduction. In: Weersink, A. & Livernois, J. (eds.). 
Exploring  alternatives.  Potential  application  of  eco-
nomic instruments to address selected environmental 
problems  in  Canadian  agriculture.  Canada:  Environ-
mental Bureau, Agriculture and Agri-food Canada. p. 
47–76.
Shortle, J.S. & Abler, D.G. 1997. Nonpoint pollution. In: Fol-
mer, H. et al. (eds.). The international yearbook of envi-
ronmental and resource economics 1997/1998. A sur-
vey of current issues. p. 114–155.
Shortle, J.S., Abler, D.G.& Ribaudo, M. 2001. Agriculture 
and water quality: the issues. In: Shortle, J.S. & Abler, 
D. (eds.). Environmental policies for agricultural pollu-
tion control. UK: CABI Publishing. p. 1–18.
Simmelsgaard,  S.E.  1991.  Estimering  af  funktioner  for 
kvælstofudvaskning. Kvælstofudvaskning som funktion 
af  kvælstoftilførsel  for  forskellige  afgrøder  dyrket  på 
sandjord og lerjord. In: Rude, S. (ed.). Kvælstofgødning 
i landbruget – behov og udvaskning nu og i fremtiden. 
Copenhagen. Institute of Agricultural Economics. Re-
port 62. p. 135–150.
Simmelsgaard, S.E. & Djurhuus, J. 1998. An empirical mod-
el for estimating nitrate leaching as affected by crop 
type and long-term N fertilizer rate. Soil Use and Man-
agement 14: 37–43.
Simunic, I., Tomic, F. & Klacic, Z. 1998. Djelovanje drenazi 
na  koncentraciju  dusika  u  drenaznoj  vodi.  Hrvatske 
vode 1. p. 107–110.
Sumelius, J. 1993. A response analysis of wheat and barley 
to nitrogen in Finland. Agricultural Science in Finland 2: 
465–480.
Sumelius, J. 1994. Controlling nonpoint source pollution of 
nitrogen  from  agriculture  through  economic  instru-
ments in Finland. Agricultural Economics Research In-
stitute publications 74. 
Tauer,  L.W.  1995.  Do  New York  dairy  farmers  maximize 
proﬁts or minimize costs? American Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics 77, May 1995: 421–429.
Toma, L. 2002. Farming systems and rural community wel-
fare from an environmental perspective. A case study 
on agricultural nonpoint source pollution in Romania. 
In: Pre-proceedings of the Fifth IFSA European Sym-
posium,  Farming  and  Rural  Systems  Research  and 
Extension,  Florence,  Italy:  Università  degli  Studi  di 
Firenze, Facolta di Agraria. p. 408–417.
Tomic, F., Simunic, I., Petosic, D., Stricevic, I. & Klacic, Z. 
1997. Utjecaj cijevne drenaze na ispiranje dusika iz tla. 
4.  strucna  sjednica  Radne  skupine  “Zastita  tla”  Po-
dunavskih zemalja, Osijek. 
Varian,  H.  1992.  Microeconomic  analysis.  3rd  ed.  USA. 
506 p.
Vatn, A., Bakken, L.R., Bleken, M.A., Botterweg, P., Lun-
deby, H., Romstad, E., Rørstad, P.K. & Vold, A. 1996. 
Policies for reduced nutrient losses and erosion from 
Norwegian agriculture. Norwegian Journal of Agricul-
tural Sciences Supplement 23. 319 p.
Vatn, A., Bakken, L.R., Lundeby, H., Romstad, E., Rørstad, 
P.K. & Vold, A. 1997. Regulating nonpoint source pollu-
tion from agriculture: An integrated modelling analysis. 
European Review of Agricultural Economics 24: 207–
229.
Weinberg, M. 1991. Economic incentives for the control of 
agricultural non-point source water pollution. Depart-
ment of Agricultural Economics, U.C. Davis. 259 p. (Un-
published dissertation).
Yadav, S.N, Peterson, W. & Easter, W. 1996. Do farmers 
overuse nitrogen fertilizer to the detriment of the envi-
ronment? Environmental and Resource Economics 9: 
323–340.
Zellei, A. 2001. Challenges for agri-environmental policies 
in  CEE  countries.  CEESA  discussion  paper  No 
3/6/2001. Humboldt University of Berlin, Chair of Re-
source Economics, Berlin. 34 p.
Zellei, A., Gorton, M. & Lowe, P. 2002. A comparative analy-
sis of the Polish, Lithuanian and Slovakian case studies 
on the implementation of the Nitrate Directive. In: Zellei, 
A.  et  al.  (eds.).  Alternative  concepts  of  agri-environ-
mental policies in Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. Report of the Central and Eastern Sustainable 
Agriculture  (CEESA).  University  of  Newcastle,  New-
castle. p. 59–76.309
A G R I C U L T U R A L  A N D  F O O D  S C I E N C E
Vol. 14 (2005): 293–309.
Artikkelissa analysoidaan nitraattitypen vähentämiseen 
tähtäävien  vero-ohjauskeinojen  rajakustannus,  tietyn 
nitraattipitoisuuden vähentämisen kokonaiskustannus ja 
veron vaikutuksia NO3-huuhtoumaan Kroatian maatalou-
dessa. Analysoitavana on 50 % typpivero, 100 % tuote-
vero ja tätä huuhtoumaa vastaava typpikiintiö tilatasolla. 
Typpihuuhtouman vähentämisen rajakustannus tuottaa 
tietoa siitä, kuinka paljon typpilannoituksen intensiteet-
tiä tulisi vähentää mainituilla keinoilla ennen kuin muut 
toimenpiteet (esim. ympäristötuki suojakaistoille, kos-
teikoille tai välikasvustolle) tulisivat kyseeseen.
Maissin typpilannoituskokeiden perusteella estimoi-
tiin kolme tuotantofunktiota ja johdettiin vastaava voit-
toa  maksimoiva  typpilannoitustaso.  Lysimetriveden 
NO3-N  pitoisuuksien  perusteella  estimoitiin  NO3-N 
huuhtoumafunktio.  Estimoitua  voittoa  maksimoivaa 
typpilannoitustasoa verrattiin otokseen, joka käsitti 20 
perheviljelmää.  Otoksesta  laskettiin  hehtaarikohtainen 
käytetyn typen määrä väkilannoitteissa ja lannassa. Tilo-
jen  maksamia  typpilannoitehintoja  ja  saatuja  maissin 
tuottajahintoja käytettiin voittoa maksimoivan typpilan-
noitustason määrittämiseksi. Lopuksi estimoitiin voittoa 
maksimoivaa  lannoitustasoa  (171,7  kg/ha)  vastaava 
NO3-pitoisuus, tilojen nykykäytännön mukainen NO3-
pitoisuus sekä typpiveron, tuoteveron ja lannoitekiintiön 
voittoa maksimoivan lannoitustason vastaavat NO3-pi-
toisuudet.
Tulokset  viittaavat  siihen,  että  otoksen  viljelijät 
käyttävät  enemmän  typpeä  kuin  voittoa  maksimoiva 
taso edellyttäisi, mikäli lannan typpi otetaan huomioon 
(206–230 N kg/ha). Mikäli lannan typpeä ei oteta huo-
mioon, viljelijät lannoittavat jonkin verran alle voittoa 
maksimoivan typpilannoitustason (160,6 N kg/ha). Vil-
jelijöiden käyttämät typpiravinteet ml. lannan typpi joh-
taa  estimoituihin  pohjaveden  NO3-pitoisuuksiin,  jotka 
ovat  162–192%  korkeampia  kuin  nitraattidirektiivin 
edellyttämä kriittinen taso, 50 mg/l NO3. Voittoa maksi-
moivalla typpitasolla NO3-pitoisuus estimoitiin tasolle 
62 mg/l NO3. Typpikiintiön nitraattihuuhtouman vähen-
tämisen rajakustannus oli negatiivinen (–0.649 euro/mg/
l NO3), mikä viittaa siihen, että vero tuottaa positiivisen 
nettotulon  jo  ilman  ympäristöhyötyjen  ottamista  huo-
mioon. Vasta yli 60 % typpiveroa vastaava vähentämis-
kustannus muuttuu negatiiviseksi. Lannoitusintensiteetti 
tällä tasolla on 105 kg/ha typpeä. Vasta alhaisimmilla 
lannoitustasoilla kannattaisi harkita vaihtoehtoisia toi-
menpiteitä (esim. ympäristötukea suojakaistoille, kasvi-
peitteisyydelle tai kosteikoille). Mainittujen verokeino-
jen rajavähentämiskustannus ei ole vakio ja se kasvaa 
kiihtyvästi.
Typpiverolla saavutetun NO3-vähentämisen rajakus-
tannus on alhaisin, mikäli nitraattityppeä ei vähennetä 
enempää kuin 50 mg/l NO3. Typpikiintiöllä saavutetun 
NO3-vähentämisen  rajakustannus  on  alhaisempi  kuin 
tuoteverolla saavutetun NO3-vähentämisen rajakustan-
nus vähentämisen tasoilla alle 20 mg/l NO3, mutta kor-
keampi  kuin  tuoteveron  rajakustannus  korkeimmilla 
vähentämisen tasoilla. Viljelijöiden satotaso on lisäksi 
3 100–3 800 kg/ha alhaisempi kuin olisi mahdollista täl-
lä lannoitustasolla. Viljelijöiden olisi mahdollista nostaa 
nettotulojaan joko vaikuttamalla muihin kuin lannoitus-
ta rajoittaviin kasvutekijöihin tai pienentämällä lannoi-
tepanosta.
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